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Abstract
Contrary to conventional thinking, this paper shows that divorced women exhibit lower levels of
poverty than divorced men. We use data from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS-
HSE) for the period of 20102017. The result remains qualitatively invariant when considering
assortative mating along education to alleviate possible endogeneity between divorce and poverty.
Investigating an inter-related dynamic model of poverty and female labor market participation, we
find that higher female labor participation partly explains why a divorce is harder on husbands
than on wives.
Keywords: Divorce; Gender; Russia; Labor Market; Dynamic Bivariate estimation; Longitu-
dinal Survey.
JEL classifications: I31; I32; J12; J16; J60.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we investigate the economic well-being of divorcees and married individuals in
Russia, using the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey for the period of 20102017.1 Our purpose
is to uncover what explains the differences in poverty levels between individuals who stayed married
throughout the period of analysis and those who divorced before 2010 and stayed divorced throughout
the entire period.
Two considerations drive our research interest. Firstly, the worldwide increase in divorce rates
has brought divorce to the center of the analysis of well-being of individuals. In 2018, almost 50%
of all marriages in the United States ended in divorce, with a divorce taking place every 13 seconds.
It appears essential, then, to better understand whether there exist well-being differences between
*We thank Anastasia Litina and Simone Moriconi, for their insightful comments. The paper has benefited from
presentation at the Gender and Economics Workshop at University of Luxembourg, 2019. Authors are grateful to their
supportive partners who made research possible during the COVID-19 pandemic. The usual disclaimer applies.
Corresponding author, DEM, University of Luxembourg, 6 Rue Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1359 Luxembourg,
email: victoria.maleeva@uni.lu
DEM, University of Luxembourg, email: majlinda.joxhe@uni.lu
DEM, University of Luxembourg, email: skerdilajda.zanaj@uni.lu
1Source: Russia Longitudinal Monitoring survey, RLMS-HSE, conducted by the National Research University
Higher School of Economics and OOO Demoscope, together with the Carolina Population Center, University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and the Institute of Sociology of the Federal Center of Theoretical and Applied
Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences. (RLMS-HSE websites: http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/rlms-hse,
http://www.hse.ru/org/hse/rlms)
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divorcees and married individuals. Are there any gender differences? Secondly, the country with the
highest divorce rate is Russia (OECD, 2019). The crude divorce rate in 2015 in Russia was 4.2 divorces
per 1000 residents (Rosstat, 2015).2 This obviously makes the Russian case highly interesting.
The literature provides three approaches to measuring economic well-being: absolute poverty,
which compares money income with subsistence level; deprivation, which measures how different in-
dividual consumption is compared to the average consumption in the reference population; and most
recently, a subjective measure that explores individuals' perceptions of their economic condition. In the
present paper, we use all these types of measures. In the benchmark estimation, we use income poverty
as the outcome variable. We then run estimations using a multidimensional deprivation indicator that
includes also subjective measures.
A crucial aspect of poverty is persistence. Prior literature has explored whether past poverty
experiences determine current poverty status. For instance, poverty spells might result in depreciation
of human capital that leads to low pay or longer unemployment spells, which ultimately increase poverty
spells. However, the state-dependence usually observed in dynamic panel data models may also be
attributed to sorting effects in the sense that the individuals who escape poverty may possess certain
observed (e.g., education level) or unobserved characteristics (ability, social networks) and thus differ
in a systematic way from the individuals who remain poor. To establish whether state dependence is
genuine or an over-representation, we control for observed and unobserved heterogeneity, as well as the
initial condition, in a dynamic model.
In our benchmark model, it is hard to claim that divorce causes poverty, despite the fact
that in our data divorce has taken place years before the poverty level we are analyzing. Indeed, we
cannot tell whether, a divorced individual is less poor than a married one, or whether, those who get
divorced are the better economically endowed men and women. To tackle this problem, we would need
exogenous variation in divorce that does not explain poverty. To the best of our knowledge, in Russia
during the period under investigation, there were no changes in the divorce law that could allow proper
identification. Any other IV strategy that points to individual characteristics will explain both poverty
level and divorce. For this reason, we have decided to proceed differently. We estimate the probability
of divorce when couples are assorted along the education level. More precisely, we proxy the quality
of the match between spouses (and the thus the probability of divorce) using the level of education of
the wife and the husband in married and divorce couples from 1995 to 2017. We then match married
couples in the 20102017 sample to the probability of divorce corresponding to a specific educational
assortative matching. Finally, we re-run our benchmark analysis using the probability of divorce and
check how this explains poverty levels in married men and women.
Our main result can be summarized as follows. Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity and
accounting for the initial conditions problem, we find that being poor is predominantly a trap, but less
so for a divorced woman. Divorced women show less poverty than divorced men do during the period
of 20102017. Considering the marginal effects, at mean values, a divorce woman is 11 percentage
points less likely to be in income poverty than a divorced man and 12 percentage points less likely to
be multidimensional deprived. This result holds when we consider the sample of married couples and
account for the probability of divorce due to mate sorting. The higher the probability of divorce, the
2The US appears 6th in the world ranking.
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higher the poverty level of married men, whereas the probability of divorce does not affect the poverty
levels of married women.
Worldwide, women make up the majority of the poor due to the gendered division of assets,
gender pay gaps, and cultural norms. As shown in our estimations, age, occupation, education level,
presence of young children, urban vs. rural residency, and marital status are all key factors explaining
female poverty. One would expect divorce to hit a female partner harder, which indeed appears to be
the case in OECD countries. However, our analysis shows that this is not the case in Russia, where
men suffer a larger loss of marriage premium than women do. Why is this the case?
An extensive body of research in economics (a seminal paper is Becker (1973)), sociology, and
anthropology studies matching and sorting patterns in marriage markets. This literature has docu-
mented that marriages are not random but exhibit strong sorting patterns along various characteristics
such as height, age, and above all, education level (Kalmijn, 1998). Historically in Russia, women have
outnumbered men. Prolonged years of high rates of death among men in the 1990s and early 2000s
further deteriorated this gender imbalance. In 2018, there were 78.8 million women and 68.1 million
men in the country. The gender ratio over all ages is 1.156, whereas for the population aged over 70,
this number reaches 2.38 (Rosstat, 2018). Couples marry very early, and women have a higher level
of education on average. Our analysis of marital sorting for a very long period on a sample that is
representative of the Russian population shows that almost 60% of divorced couples had spouses not
assorted along the education level. In addition, 43.56% of divorces in the period of 19952017 occurred
in couples where the wife had a higher education level than her husband. Only in 16.44% of the couples
that divorced did the husband have more years of education than his ex-wife. Ultimately, as shown by
our estimations, this means that divorce is more likely to cause harm to the husband than to the wife.
Continuing our exploration, we use a bivariate random effect estimation between poverty and
status in the labor market to check whether female labor participation is the mechanism behind our
result, beyond the matching pattern. Inter-related dynamics seems a natural step to take because labor
market participation and poverty (and poor living conditions) are very often different faces of the same
coin. Income from working crucially reduces the chance of falling under the poverty threshold. We
model the two processes jointly in a discrete sequential equation model where we assume that the
unemployment risk affects falling into poverty and vice versa. These bivariate estimations show that
there is a strong and significant relationship between the risk of being poor and being unemployed,
and this link evolves dynamically. Nevertheless, our main result remains unchanged and robust to the
bivariate structure. It is true that divorced women work more than divorced men, but female labor
market participation does not fully explain the difference in poverty level that remains in favor of
women.
This paper is organized as follows. First, we position our paper in relation to the relevant
literature. In Section 3, we uncover several characteristics of women in Russia in the labor market as
well as in the marriage market. In Section 4, we describe the data we use for the estimation, providing
some descriptive statistics. Section 5 is dedicated to the econometric analysis, which is followed by the
exploration of the probability of divorce for married couples when taking into account the sorting of
couples along education levels. In Section 6, we provide an analysis of the mechanism leading to our
result using interrelated dynamic estimations. Section 7 offers some concluding remarks.
3
2 Related Literature
Various prior studies relate the deterioration of female economic conditions with marital disruption,
both in the US (Duncan & Hoffman, 1985) and in several European countries (Uunk, 2004; Andreß
et al., 2006; Jarvis & Jenkins, 1999). It is argued that marriage gives support to the more socially
disadvantaged partner, and it is this last who is particularly hurt by a divorce. In the overwhelming
majority of cases in Western countries, the disadvantaged partner is the woman (Hogendoorn et al.,
2019). Sociological studies have long documented an abrupt decline in the living standards of women
after divorce in Western countries. In his influential book The Divorce Revolution, Weitzman (1985)
reported a 73% decline in the living conditions of divorced women and a 42% increase in the living
conditions of men in the USA. Things have changed considerably since Weltzam's book. Still, studies
document women being, on average, more vulnerable to divorce in western European countries. Uunk
(2004) analyzes the impact of welfare state arrangements after divorce in the European Union. He
studies the change in (yearly disposable) income accompanying divorce for women in 14 EU countries
for the years 19942000. Most women suffer economically from divorce, yet the income decline is
larger in some countries than in others. Median income declines are weakest in southern European
countries (Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal) and Scandinavian countries (Denmark and Finland)
and strongest in Austria, France, Luxembourg, and the United Kingdom. Household-size and needs-
corrected household income measures show a median income decline of 24% for European women from
one year before marital separation to one year after marital separation. Andreß et al. (2006) claims
that the most drastic income drop is experienced by women with children from countries with gender-
specific division of labor in partnership. We bring new evidence that in Russia the exact opposite is
true: it is ex-husbands who suffer more among divorcees.
Previous studies (Stewart & Swaffield 1999 or Cappellari & Jenkins 2004) document that
poverty is persistent: the probability of being lowly paid depends strongly on low pay in the previous
year.3 Similarly, Finnie & Gray (2002) find that the probability of having a transition across different
income quantiles is negatively correlated with the time period spent in a given quantile. Different
reasons explain the poverty trap. For instance, the loss of human capital, the reduction of social and
professional networks, as well as the decline in optimism or mental health are all factors that make
poverty a long-lasting phenomenon.4 In many previous studies, the feminization of poverty has been
brought to the fore. The poverty trap is a larger issue for women. Nonetheless, in Russia we find
that divorced women are more likely to break the persistence of poverty than divorced men. Another
strand of prior literature related to our work is the one making a link between the material well-being
of both partners immediately following a divorce. We clearly depart from this literature because we
observe an extremely small number of marital status switchers in the benchmark sample. We rather
3A similar phenomenon occurs with unemployment spells. Extended periods of unemployment can lead to skill losses
among workers, reducing human capital and lowering chances of exiting unemployment. However, the observed negative
duration dependence in the exit rate proves to be present, but more spuriously, in unemployment studies (Cockx &
Dejemeppe, 2005). Arulampalam (2001) examine unemployment dynamics for men using British data and accounting
for unobserved heterogeneity. They find that there is strong state dependence, especially for older unemployed individuals.
It appears evident that the individual poverty condition and the long-term unemployment risk are positively correlated.
4In addition, poverty can lead to low social mobility. Indeed, poor or materially deprived households are incapable of
engaging in education investment for their children, raising the odds that children of poor families become poor adults.
4
have two large groups of people, married vs. divorced, who kept this status for the entire period.5 It
is worth reminding the reader that, in contrast to this literature, we do not focus on the reasons that
lead to divorce. Our research interest is to explain the difference in well-being between married and
divorced individuals while accounting for gender.
3 Women in Russia
In the following sections, we construct a picture of Russian women highlighting several aspects of the
marriage market as well as female labor market participation.
3.1 The Marriage Market and Matching
Family and matrimony are institutions heavily affected by cultural norms that may be country-specific.
The Russian Federation went through significant upheavals in the 20th century. Still, some features
of the marriage market have remained unchanged. The age of entry into marriage by Russian females
has remained young compared to US or European standards. In the United States, during the period
of 19501960, the median age at marriage was 23 for men and 20 for women. In Western countries, a
pronounced trend toward delayed marriage has emerged since the 1960s. In 2018, the median age at
first marriage was almost 30 for men and almost 28 for women (U.S. Census Bureau, 2018).
According to Rosstat (2018), in Russia in the 1960s, 48.8% of women and 49% of men got
married between the ages of 20 and 24 years. In the 1990s, the age distribution for women had not
changed much: the mean age of women who got married for the first time was 20.8. Only in 2010 did
Russia witness an increase in the median age of first marriage: the majority of marriages registered
were for husbands and wives aged 25 to 29; from 2015 to 2017, the median age of first marriage for
women was 25.3 and for men it was 27.4. However, despite this increase, the age of first marriage
remains relatively young in contrast to Western trends.
In Europe and in the United States, a large set of factors has led to the current pattern
of delayed entry into marriage. These include changing male and female employment opportunities,
career-building, the growth of alternative formulas for cohabitation, and financial insecurity (Cherlin,
2004).
The age at entry into marriage has implications for the stability of marital unions. Numerous
prior studies show that individuals who marry at a young age tend to be at a high risk of marital
disruption (Lehrer, 1996; Teachman, 2002). The results of this literature are compatible with the very
high rates of divorce in Russia.6
5Jalovaara (2003) uses matched census and administrative data from Finland and shows that Finnish women whose
earnings exceeded their husbands' were significantly more likely to become divorced. Thielemans & Mortelmans (2019)
studied female labor force participation after divorce using the divorce project in Flanders. The authors used a discrete-
time hazard model to estimate the hazards of the first employment increase around the moment of separation. Censoring
took place at the first event occurrence or after 4 years, whichever came first. Women were twice as likely to increase
their employment for a short period of time after the separation. There was an increasingly negative relationship between
employment intensity at the time of separation and the probability of increasing employment immediately afterwards.
Observed differences between homemakers and unemployed women were likely due to compositional differences at the
time of separation.
6Undoubtedly, divorce procedures have a great impact on divorce statistics. It is likely that liberal family laws are a
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Females are more educated then men in Russia.7 It is known that a high level of education for
husbands translates into high economic resources that stabilize marriage, but whether the education
level and resources of wives have a similar effect has long been debated among social scientists (see
Lyngstad & Jalovaara, 2010, for a review).8 Economists argue that female human capital can lead to
divorce because it decreases returns to a gendered division of labor (Becker et al., 1977). In addition,
education helps reduce wives' financial dependence on their husbands. Nonetheless, it is unclear why
wives' economic resources do not improve the family living standard and economic security and thus
stabilize marriages. Indeed, the evidence is that educated women divorce less than women with lower
levels of education in several societies today (Härkönen & Dronkers, 2006; Kalmijn, 2013; Matysiak
et al., 2014). This may seem to contradict the model and findings by Becker et al. (1977), but the
two results are consistent once we consider matching in marriage. Educational assortative mating can
strengthen the quality of a match, increasing the quality of the marriage (Bonke & Esping-Andersen,
2011). This is exactly what we find in the paper. In Russia, divorced women show a higher level of
education than married ones, whereas divorced men reveal a lower level of education than married ones
(see Table 2). This feature, together with the early age of marriage as well as the gender imbalance,
suggests that the quality of matching in Russia may be a reason why divorce hits husbands harder than
wives. Furthermore, as will be clarified in Section 5.2, the share of married couples in which partners
have the same level of education amounts to 46.81% during the years of 19952017, whereas 60% of
divorced couples are not assorted along education years.
3.2 Poverty and the Labor Market
The years immediately after the economic transition in Russia were accompanied by strong changes
in society that clearly had repercussions on the labor market. Both males and females in Russia are
employed, meaning that most of their prosperity is determined by wage earnings. Accordingly, to a
large extent, wage has an effect on individuals' and households' standards of well-being and economic
possibilities for investment in education. High employment in the presence of low wage floors is linked
with a large number of low paid jobs. It seems that wages are a substitute for unemployment.
The presence of low-paid jobs was always large in the 90s and early 2000s, but it has declined
over time. One recent study shows that the size of the low-paid group decreased from 30% of total
employment in 2002 to 24% in 2016 (Gimpelson et al., 2018). These rates are markedly higher than
the average for EU countries (17%). The chances of being low-paid are significantly higher for workers
with lower levels of education and skills and for those residing outside large cities.
The labor market in Russia has inherited several characteristics from its communist past.
During the USSR period, gender equality was at the top of the political agenda. Several initiatives, not
crucial factor accounting for Russia's appalling divorce rate. These laws make divorce inexpensive (190400 US dollars)
and fast (within weeks) as compared to some EU countries such as Italy, for instance, where both the time needed to get
a divorce and the costs are very high. However, one may argue that these laws are a consequence of social norms that
determine the age of getting married rather than vice versa.
7This is documented in Table 2 for our database.
8Moreover, Joerg et al. (2016) argue that female human capital that was developed in the PolishLithuanian Com-
monwealth and other eastern European countries (including Russia) was based in a specific human capital indicator,
numeracy. Their study shows that this ability had important impacts on a series of outcomes like nutrition and geography,
but most importantly, on female autonomy.
6
only in Russia but in several eastern countries, were implemented to boost female labor participation.9
Since those times, Russia and other eastern European countries (Ukraine, Poland, Romania,
etc.) have had comparatively high labor force participation rates among married women. Russian
employment levels are above the OECD average, and the female employment rate is on the rise and
amongst the highest in the world. Female employment levels in Russia exceed those of males in some
European countries (e.g., in southern Europe). Such high rates hold despite the country's rather early
retirement age (55 and 60 years for women and men, respectively)10.
4 Data and Summary Statistics
In this section, we describe our data source and present summary statistics for dependent variables
and relevant control covariates.
4.1 Data
Our data come from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey conducted by the Higher School
of Economics (RLMS-HSE). We explicitly define all variables used in our study in Appendix 1.2
and provide summary statistics in Table 1. The RLMS-HSE collects information for a nationally
representative sample of households across the Russian Federation.11
The survey provides micro-level data on households and individuals. The household is the
unit of observation in the survey. In addition to the household questionnaire, each member of the
household is asked to fill an individual questionnaire (either an adult or a child questionnaire). The
survey comprises 25 rounds conducted from 1992 to now, with the target sample size of 4000 households
per year.
We focus on the period of 2010 to 2017. This restriction is due to the requirement of a balanced
panel for the dynamic regressions. This period allows the longest balanced panel that maximizes the
number of divorced individuals followed throughout the 7 years. For the purpose of our estimation,
we limit the sample individuals to those with consecutive observations in the panel (t, t + 1, t + 2,
...) and a one-year lagged observation (t − 1). The latter is necessary because of the dynamic nature
of the specification. Furthermore, in order to ensure a good level of representativeness at the country
level, we construct a representative balanced panel starting from 2010. We take individuals who are
included in the representative sample in 2010 and add observations for these individuals for the years
of 20112017. We do not use post-stratification weights, following the suggestion of Heeringa & Arbor
(1997) regarding the use of weights in multivariate analyses with fixed effects.12
9For instance, Murphy & Telhaj (2019) argue that in 1967, Albania became the first country in the world to fully ban
religion. Archive documents show that the Communist Party Bureau leaders took such a decision to increase the labor
participation of women, who were held back from working due to religious norms.
10In 2019, the retirement age was increased from 55 to 60 for females and from 60 to 64 for males in Russia
11The RLMS-HSE is conducted by the National Research University Higher School of Economics and OOO Demo-
scope, headed by Polina Kozyreva and Mikhail Kosolapov, together with the Carolina Population Center, University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill, headed by Barry M. Popkin, and the Federal Center of Theoretical and Applied Sociology
of the Russian Academy of Sciences.
12In RLMS data, the household characteristics that explain the greatest variation in weights are geographic region and
urban/rural area, based on the administrative division in which the dwelling is located. Variation in individual weights
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After dropping observations with missing crucial information, the balanced dataset comprises
1951 individuals, of whom 1536 stayed married for the 8 years and 144 stayed divorced throughout the
period, for a total of 13,657 person-year observations.13
We measure material well-being with the individual's total income, which includes salary,
pensions, bonuses, profits, benefits, material aid, odd jobs, and other cash receipts.
4.2 Poverty Indicators
We consider income poverty as well as multidimensional deprivation. An individual is defined as
income-poor if his/her total reported income is less than the minimal vital income. The minimum
vital income is fixed by the Russian government at the regional level and is calculated on the basis
of the price of a consumer basket in each region. In order to capture the multidimensional nature
of poverty, we define an individual as multidimensionally poor if he/she is deprived in at least one
dimension: economic, material, or health.14
At first, to draw the poverty line, we use the official poverty threshold, i.e., a minimum vital
income, issued by the Russian Statistical Office. Costs related to non-grocery-good items and utility
payments are also included in the minimum vital income. If the individual's total income is less than
the minimum vital income, then the individual is considered poor and acquires the right to ask for the
vital income. The government defines three different thresholds for the minimum vital income: one for
adults, one for children, and another for retired individuals.
Using this poverty threshold in our sample, we have 1203 individuals classified as never poor
during 20102017 and 255 who were considered poor during the whole period. Out of this, we recognize
a gender poverty gap between females and males, with 27% of females and 16% of males being under
the poverty income threshold, as shown in Table 1.
The development economics literature that focuses on poverty argues that total income is
not the only indicator of poverty. Multidimensional poverty measures can be used to create a more
comprehensive picture. These measures reveal not only who is poor but also how individuals are poor,
showing the range of different disadvantages. A poor individual can suffer multiple disadvantages at
the same time, such as poor health or malnutrition, lack of clean water or electricity, poor quality of
work, or no schooling.
To capture these multidimensional aspects, we build an indicator of multidimensional poverty.
The structure of this variable can be found in Appendix A1.4. To develop this index, we follow Alkire
et al. (2014). More specifically, we use a dual-cutoff method proposed in Alkire & Foster (2011). The
variables consist of 3 dimensions: economic, living conditions, and health. The economic dimension
includes income poverty and work intensity. An individual is considered deprived in work intensity
will reflect geographic effects for households as well as differentials due to post-stratification of the sample by major
geographic region, age, and sex.
13There were only 26 individuals who experienced a marital change during the years under study; therefore, we could
not conduct an analysis using the switchers.
14We also include self-evaluation of economic conditions in the multidimensionality of the poverty indicator by con-
sidering the negative answer to the question Do you or your family have the opportunity, if you wish, to make a big
purchase?  and Are you concerned about providing yourself with the most necessary things in the next 12 months? 
Respondents were considered deprived if they answered very concerned.
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(a) All Individuals (b) Divorced Individuals
Figure 1: Real-income dynamics by gender
if he/she works more than 8 hours per day, on average. Deprivation in living conditions is reflected
by the material deprivation variable (list of variables in Table A1.3). Paying attention to what is
considered vital for a Russian household, we take into account the possession of several items such as
central sewerage, mobile phone, microwave, refrigerator, hot water, color TV, a dacha15 and availability
of regular meals. We also control for questions about perceived economic well-being: whether an
individual has the ability to make big purchase and whether they can provide themselves with the
most necessary things over the next year.
The health dimension includes 3 variables: self-evaluated health conditions, chronic disease,
and the answer to the question Have you rejected medical help because of a lack of money in the last
year? Each of the three dimensions is equally weighted (1/3). Finally, an individual is considered
multidimensionally poor if she/he is deprived in at least one dimension or the equivalent sum of the
weighted deprivations.
The multidimensional poverty indicator shows a different picture of well-being in Russia.
When using multidimensional poverty, we have 513 individuals who were not poor, 823 individuals
who were deprived for the entire period, and 370 individuals who changed status, either upward or
downward. With respect to this indicator, there are no gendered differences; 59% of both males and
females were multidimensionally poor, as shown in Table 1.
Finally, to highlight some relevant income differences in our database, we build the following
graphs. Figure 1a and Figure 1b display, respectively, the median real income for women and men
for the years of 20102017 and the median real income for divorced women and men. Men have
almost twice as much income, but divorced women exhibit, on average, 6338 rubles more in income
than divorced men. Considering men and women separately, Figure 2 shows that divorced women
outperform married women, whereas divorced men do worse than married ones.
4.3 Summary Statistics
Table 1 provides summary statistics regarding our outcome and main explanatory variables. Controls
include marital status, age, gender, presence of children under 18 years of age, education level, self-
evaluated health status, geographical position, and income. Our sample is composed of 1119 women
15A dacha is sort of a country house used only during the summer period and poorly equipped.
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(a) Female (b) Male
Figure 2: Real-income dynamics by marital status
and 832 men. This gender imbalance is representative of the Russian population.16
The first two columns display sample averages and standard deviations for females, whereas
the other two report information about male participants. Divorced females are represented by a
higher percentage (13%) as compared to divorced men (4%), and these shares are representative of the
Russian population. In terms of average age, we observe a slightly younger female sample, whereas with
respect to education level, there is clearly a gender difference. Males more often report elementary and
secondary education compared to females. Instead, females represent a higher percentage of technical
and higher education. These summary statistics provide insight into a positive (female) gender gap
with respect to education in Russia. In addition, women are slightly more present in urban areas.
There is quite a large difference between retired men (11%) and women (25%) due to the different life
expectancies between genders in the Russian Federation. In terms of employment rate, females are still
less employed than males and possess less working experience in years. There are no gender differences
in terms of health status, especially for very good or bad health.
5 Empirical Analysis
To uncover the dynamic differences between married and divorced individuals in the Russian Fed-
eration, we estimate a random effects model applied to the period of 20102017 with poverty (or
multidimensional poverty) as the outcome variable. Our ultimate interest is to highlight the difference
between divorced and married individuals.
Our benchmark specification considers as the outcome variable different measures of poverty
as defined in Section 4.2. In regards to the control variables, we include variables capturing observable
characteristics of individuals (gender17, age18, residency, education, health19, etc.) so as to control for
the observed heterogeneity among individuals, but also time and regional dummies.
At least three main sources of endogeneity must be tackled in our endeavor to identify causal
16Russian National Statistics Office:https://eng.gks.ru
17There is a large literature that provides evidence of gendered differences in poverty levels.
18We control for age since the link between health and unemployment is especially relevant for older workers, seeing
as health deteriorates with age.
19The nature of the relationship between poor health and non-employment is well established in the literature. Poor
health is one of the key determinants of labor market inactivity and an important factor driving individuals out of work
and reducing their probability of entry into employment (Kalwij & Vermeulen, 2008).
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effects of marital status on poverty. We have an issue of reverse causality between poverty level and
divorce. To tackle this problem, we make use of matching methods to determine the probability
of divorce. We postpone the discussion and the analysis of this type of endogeneity until Section
5.1 of the paper. Two further econometric issues may bias our empirical specification: individual
unobserved heterogeneity and the initial condition problem. Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity
is a fundamental challenge in empirical research because a large set of individual characteristics are
not observable and this may impact the outcomes. If these factors are correlated with the variables
of interest, then without taking into account proper corrections, omitted variables bias the estimated
parameters, precluding causal inference. One possible way to account for unobserved heterogeneity
in a panel setting is to include individual fixed effects (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). We account for
the panel dimension of the data by using individual random effects. Given our model specification
in Section 5.1, where we include lagged dependent variables, we perform a random effect estimation,
assuming that unobserved heterogeneity is constant over time and is correlated with the independent
variable.20
Furthermore, the dynamics of our dataset brings us to another econometric issue: the initial
condition problem, which goes back to the seminal work of Heckman (1987). Arulampalam et al.
(2000) stress that in order to disentangle the effect of state-dependence from unobserved heterogeneity,
the initial conditions need to be modeled instead of assumed as exogenously given because the initial
conditions may be correlated with the unobservables. Contextualized in our setting, initial conditions
refer to the fact that those who are materially deprived or below the poverty threshold in the first
year of the analysis, i.e., 2010, are not randomly selected, implying that the sample from the first
year of the survey may be a non-random sample of the Russian population. The problem of initial
conditions has been previously analyzed in the poverty literature, but we stress the role of marital
status for both partners. To alleviate the initial condition problem, we follow Wooldridge (2005),
who proposes a solution for the problem of endogeneity of the initial conditions while controlling for
unobserved heterogeneity at the same time. He suggests using a joint density distribution conditional
on the strictly exogenous variables and the initial condition, instead of attempting to obtain the joint
distribution of all outcomes of the endogenous variables. For a binary models such as ours, the main
advantage of this method is that it can be applied easily using standard random-effects software.
5.1 Empirical Specifications
5.1.1 Baseline Estimation
Our benchmark empirical model measures the dynamic evolution of individual poverty. We run a
probability random effect regression where Yi,t represents the poverty of individual i at time t:
poori,t =λpoori,t−1 + γ1Divorcei,t + γ2Femalei,t + γ12Divorcei,t × Femalei,t+
βx′i,t + ψz
′
i + φpoori,1 + δx¯
′
i,t + αr + αt + αi + ui,t.
(1)
The dependent variable poori,t takes a value of one if individual i is below the threshold of
20Being aware of dynamics in poverty, we have opted for a dynamic random-effects model to control for lagged
dependent variables, rather than a panel fixed-effect model. We have also run a simple logit FE model without lagged
poverty, but the results hint to the same direction.
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poverty in time t and zero otherwise. The variable Divorce captures the marital status and takes a value
of one if the individual is divorced. The vector β represents time-variant parameters of interest, such
as age, experience, household size, etc., and zi is the vector of time-invariant parameters. We include
individual random effects, captured by the variables αi, as well as year dummies αt and regional
dummies αr. To control for the initial conditions, we include the variable poori,1 and longitudinal
means of time-variant variables x¯i,t.
The average marginal effects of the estimation are shown in Table 3.21 Results for multidi-
mensional poverty are in Table 4. The coefficients for the lagged poverty status and initial poverty
are significant at a 99% level of confidence, implying that the effect of state dependence is present
and strong. Women are 9 percentage points more likely to be poor, and poverty is state-dependent.
The coefficient of divorce is not significant. Nonetheless, the marginal effect of the intersection term
Divorce × Female is significant and predicts that a divorced female is 11 percentage points less likely
to be in income poverty.
Given the nature of our research question, we report only marginal effects for the coefficient
of interest, female, divorce, and the interaction between the two. Nevertheless, we can see from the
output Table 3 that age, education, and living in an urban area negatively impact the probability
of becoming poor. Instead, household size and having children increase the probability of becoming
poor.22
Table 4 instead provides the results of the univariate estimation when multidimensional
poverty is the outcome variable. The effect of the interaction coefficient between female and divorce
variables is significant and negative, suggesting that divorced women are 12 percentage points less
likely to become multidimensionally poor.
5.2 Mating and the Probability of Divorce
In our benchmark model, we cannot claim causality between divorce and poverty despite divorce having
taken place in the past and looking at years of poverty after divorce. Indeed, we cannot tell whether
a divorced individual is less poor than a married one or, rather, whether those who get divorced are
better economically endowed men and women.
To tackle this problem, we would need exogenous variation in divorce that does not explain
poverty. To the best of our knowledge, in Russia during the period under investigation, there was no
change in the divorce law that could allow proper identification. Any other IV strategy that points
to individual characteristics affects both poverty level and divorce. For this reason, we have decided
to proceed differently and investigate the married couples in our sample. Our aim is to check how
the probability of divorcing, properly defined, affects the poverty of married individuals. To be able
to construct this probability, we extrapolate information about the quality of the match in married
couples and divorced ones, where quality is determined by educational sorting. To do so, we estimate
a probability of divorce determined by the education assortative mating of couples, using data from
1995 to 2017 to expand the number of divorcees we can trace. Then finally, we match this estimated
probability of divorce to married couples in our sample from 20102017, using educational sorting as
21See Appendix A1 for the marginal effects calculation of the model.
22The marginal effects of control variables are available upon request.
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the criterion for the match.
We describe the method in detail below. We start with the estimations of the probability of
divorce, and then we present the results of our benchmark analysis using this estimated probability.
5.2.1 Probability of Divorce
Being aware of the endogeneity issue of reverse causality, we look at the quality of the marriage as
an indicator of future divorce. The probability of divorce may be due to multiple reasons (observed
and unobserved) but one reason is certainly the quality of the marriage. One possible way to detect
the quality of a marriage is to check the mating of couples along education levels, through assortative
matching as in Eika et al. (2019).23 Our basic idea is to check the characteristics of divorced couples, and
in particular, to sort out their level of matching along education levels. Based on this information, we
then try to estimate a probability of divorce for married couples with the same matched characteristics
of our divorced sample.
As a first step, we consider the whole period covered by the RLMS-HSE survey, from 1995 to
2017. The purpose is to identify individuals who stayed married or divorced and extract information
about the characteristics of married couples vs. those of divorced couples. Using these enlarged data,
we are able to describe the level of education of wives and husbands. Said differently, we can identify
how often assortative matching occurs in this representative sample of the Russian population over a
considerably long timespan. For each possible level of education in the database, we create a categorical
variable: Elementary Match, Secondary Match, Vocational Match, and University Match. In Table 5,
we report the full description of each variable. Variables take values from 0 to 4. Each value indicates
the educational level of the individual as well as the educational level of her/his partner. As an example,
the variable Elementary Match is equal to 1 when an individual possesses elementary education and
their partner does too; Elementary Match equals to 2 when the individual has elementary education
and his/her partner has secondary education, and so on, for each possible level of education of the
partner, leading to a complete picture for couples with one partner having elementary school. We do
the same complete description for all couples where one of the partners has secondary education, using
the variable Secondary Match, as well as for couples where one partner has vocational training, and
finally, university education. These four variables fully describe all possible educational combinations
of married couples in the database.
In Table 6, we provide summary statistics for the education of husbands and wives in couples
who stayed married and couples who got divorced. We observe 6733 couples who stayed married during
the period of observation (19952017) and 705 divorced couples. We group them by considering the
education of the wife as the benchmark category (Elementary MatchWife, Secondary MatchWife,
Vocational MatchWife, University MatchWife in bold). Considering couples in which both spouses
possess elementary education, 459 couples stayed married and 38 couples got divorced. However, in
couples where the wife has a university degree and the husband has only finished elementary school,
107 couples stayed married and 18 divorced. The most striking differences in divorce rates occur in
couples in which both partners have a university degree and in couples where the wife has a university
23Random matching may also occur, in particular for couples with low levels of education, but we are looking only at
one particular dimension.
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degree and the husband has some vocational or technical training. In both of these cases, the quality
of the marriage seems superior because the match is more stable, reducing the chances of marital
dissolution.
We use this enlarged sample of couples to estimate the probability of divorce separately for
females and males. For females, we estimate the following probability model:
divorcew =β1Elementaryw + β2Secondaryw + β3V ocationalw + β4Higherw+
γ1Ageh + uw,
(2)
where the subscript w indicates wife and h indicates husband. The probit model for males is easily
derived by substituting the subscript w with h. We report the results in Table 9. If spouses have
the same level of education, we see that the probability of divorce takes the smallest value when
both partners have a university education, whereas it takes the highest value when both partners
have an elementary education. An increase in the age of the partner decreases the probability of
marriage dissolution. Households where the wife is working show a higher probability of divorce. As a
consequence, it appears more probable that female labor participation is present in the household when
marital dissolution occurs. Finally, the working status of the husband does not significantly affect the
probability of getting divorced for the wife.
5.2.2 Poverty and Probability of Divorce
We are now in the condition to estimate the poverty specification by clustering errors at the individual
level and using the estimated probability of divorce as a regressor. In this subsection, we focus only on
married couples. Our purpose is to uncover how the probability of divorce, as estimated above, affects
the poverty of married individuals. We describe the estimation of the benchmark model for the years
of 20102017.
In the sample corresponding to the benchmark analysis, keeping only married couples for
which partners filled in the questionnaire, we are left with 488 individuals observed over 8 years. We
then match the predicted probabilities of getting divorced, as estimated in the previous subsection,
using individual characteristics. For this, we employ the same set of variables as in Model 2: education,
age of the partner, and partners' employment.
The estimates are reported in Table 10. Reassuringly, we observe that the probability of
divorce for married couples still indicates that females who may get divorced have a lower probability
of becoming poor. Males who face a high probability of divorce due to infelicitous marital sorting face
a high probability of becoming poor. This is not true for females. The probability of divorce does
not cause women to become poorer. Hence, even when we account for a counterfactual probability of
divorcing, it seems that our results point to the same direction as those of the baseline specifications.
6 The Mechanism: Female Labor Participation of Divorcees
In the next step of our analysis, we aim to explore the mechanism behind our result. Why are divorced
women better off than married women and divorced men. Russian women are, on average, more
educated than men, and live longer, but seldom achieve positions of leadership. Of female high-school
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graduates, 89% are enrolled in tertiary education versus 75% of men, and women enjoy a healthy life
expectancy that is almost 8 years longer than that of men. In addition, there are almost as many
women as men holding a PhD (64% vs. 66%). Russian women participate in the labor force at
high levels (68.9% are in the labor market). Hence, it is reasonable to believe that divorced women
participate actively in the labor market. Do they participate more than divorced men? How does this
impact their poverty levels? To answer these questions, we explore a bivariate relationship between
poverty and labor market status to uncover the joint dynamics of the two observed characteristics.
This joint inter-temporal model of poverty and labor market participation is then estimated for the
period of 20102017.
Labor market participation and poverty (and poor living conditions) are very often faces of the
same coin. Income from working crucially reduces the chances of falling under the poverty threshold.
Previous research (Biewen, 2009) suggests that employment status and household composition are
influenced by past poverty outcomes. Plum (2017) studies the interrelated dynamics of poverty and
unemployment and shows that the risk of becoming unemployed and poor is state-dependent: it
increases with the duration of unemployment and decreases with the duration of employment in Great
Britain. Ayllón (2015) explores youth poverty dynamics in Europe and studies inter-relationships
between poverty, employment, and residential emancipation. With individual poverty condition and
long-term unemployment risk being correlated, our second main specification in this paper investigates
the inter-related dynamics of poverty and labor force participation.24
We model the two processes jointly in a discrete sequential equation model where we assume
that the unemployment risk affects falling into poverty and vice versa. To do this, we estimate a
dynamic random effect bivariate model in which we explicitly account for the joint distribution of
unobserved heterogeneity and control for the initial conditions as in Wooldridge (2005).
This is a well-known problem of initial conditions suggested by Heckman (1987) for the
univariate model. He proposes replacing the equation in the first period by a static equation. Alessie
et al. (2004) extend this approach to the bivariate case by including two static equations in the first
period. The estimation of the bivariate model can be handled by maximum likelihood methods. The
model is flexible; however, it is difficult to generalize to the higher-order dependence (include lags of
order higher than 1), and it is computationally demanding. Devicienti & Poggi (2011) propose to
account for the initial conditions problem in the bivariate model à la Wooldridge (2005) by including
longitudinal averages and the values of the dependent variables in the first period into equations.
Following Devicienti & Poggi (2011), in the present paper we use a dynamic random effect probit
model controlling for the unobserved heterogeneity and initial conditions.
For individual i, who is working or not and who is either poor or not, the following equations
24A second important specificity of poverty and unemployment variables is the state dependence of both variables.
Poverty traps and long-term unemployment determine state dependence, making the sample non-representative of the
true population, with the unemployed or poor being overrepresented in the initial period. Numerous papers show a state
dependence of poverty (for instance, Cappellari & Jenkins (2002); Bigsten & Shimeles (2008); Fertig & Tamm (2010))
and persistence of unemployment (see Stewart (2007); Crépon et al. (2005); Buddelmeyer et al. (2010)).
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are used to specify his/her condition at each year t:
poori,t = γ11Divorcei,t + γ21Femalei,t + γ31Divorcei,t × Femalei,t + λ11poori,t−1+
λ21lfpi,t−1 + β1x′1,i,t + ψ1z
′
i + φ11poori,1 + φ21lfpi,1 + δ1x¯
′
i,t + α1r + α1t + α1i + u1,i,t,
lfpi,t =γ12Divorcei,t + γ22Femalei,t + γ32Divorcei,t × Femalei,t + λ12poori,t−1+
λ22lfpi,t−1 + β2x′1,i,t + ψ2z
′
i + φ12poori,1 + φ22lfpi,1 + δ2x¯
′
i,t + α2r + α2t + α2i + u2,i,t.
(3)
The dependent variables are two dummy indicators indicating first the poverty status and second the
status of participation in the labor market. Hence, as in the univariate regression, poori,t takes a value
one if individual i is below the threshold of poverty in time t and zero otherwise, and lfpi,t assumes
a value of one if individual i is unemployed at time t. The vectors β1 and β2 are the vectors of the
coefficients of the time-invariant parameters of the explanatory covariates, as in the univariate regres-
sion, and zi is the vector of time-variant covariates. As earlier, we include individual random effects
captured by the variables α1,i and α2,i and following a bivariate normal distribution with variances
σα,1 and σα,2 and covariance ρα . The error terms u1,i,t and u2,i,t are assumed to be independent over
time and to follow a bivariate normal distribution with zero means, unit variances, and cross-equation
covariance ρu . The vectors x1,i,t and x2,i,t include a list of exogenous variables. We assume that
(α1,i,α1,i), (u1,i,t, u1,i,t) and xi,t are orthogonal.
Analogously to our benchmark estimation, Model 1, in this specification, Model 3, we include
poori,1 and lfpi,1 and the longitudinal means of the time-variant variables x¯
′
i,t: age, experience, number
of children, retired, household size. Similar to Alessie et al. (2004), we assume sequential causality, in
which the last period's unemployment is assumed to affect the current period's poverty and the last
period's unemployment is assumed to affect this period's poverty.
As in the benchmark, we face the problem of initial conditions.25 The marginal effect for the
interaction term is calculated in a similar manner as discussed for the univariate probability model but
adjusting the bivariate normal distribution instead of a univariate distribution.
In Table 11, we present the results of the bivariate estimation, whereas in Table 13 we show
results of the bivariate regression with multidimensional poverty in place of income poverty. The
significance of the coefficient of the initial period as well as the poverty and unemployment in period
t− 1 show that there is state dependence for both variables. With respect to the magnitude of divorce
status and gender in this bivariate relation, we refer the reader to Table 12. Similarly to the univariate
estimation, when performing a bivariate estimation, females are 2% points more likely than males to
be poor and unemployed. The marginal effect of the interaction term Female×Divorce also exhibits a
similar result to the univariate case: divorced females are 4% percentage points less likely be in poverty
25Our coefficients would be biased and inconsistent because the unobserved heterogeneity is correlated with the lagged
dependent variables. To overcome this problem, we follow the solution proposed by Wooldridge (2005). More specifically,
the dependent variables can be influenced by the other variables, by unobserved individual heterogeneity, and by the
presence of correlated lagged endogenous variables. This approach suggests enriching the likelihood function with the
reduced-form equation for the initial observation and then maximize using the full set of sample observations, allowing
for cross-correlation. We follow this procedure and run our baseline estimation with simulated initial conditions. Since
we control for the initial conditions problem, jointly account for unobservables in the two processes, and allow those
effects to be correlated, the sequential timing circumvents the simultaneity problem and provides identification of the
intertemporal effects. This identification strategy rules out that the stochastic shocks u1,i,t and u2,i,t affecting both
processes are correlated over time.
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and out of the labor market and almost 21% percentage points more likely to be out of poverty and in
the labor market. Hence, our main result remains unchanged and robust to the bivariate structure. It
is true that divorced women work more than divorced men, but female labor market participation does
not fully explain the difference in poverty levels that remains in favor of women even in the bivariate
estimations.
Being unemployed in t−1 clearly increases the odds of being poor in t, but being poor in t−1
also increases the chances of being unemployed in t. Hence, the causal relationship between long-term
unemployment and poverty runs both ways: poverty can reinforce joblessness just like joblessness can
increase poverty. While unemployment affecting poverty seems obvious, poverty affecting unemploy-
ment is less straightforward. However, poverty may make it more difficult to be active in the labor
market because poverty makes it more difficult to search for a job (expenses for travel to interviews,
childcare, etc.).
Table 13 and Table 14 present the results from our estimation of multidimensional poverty.
Surprisingly, marginal effects do not predict females to be significantly more multidimensionally de-
prived than males (only a weakly significant marginal effect is found for females being 1 percentage
point poorer than males). However, divorced females are shown to be 9 points more likely to be poor
and unemployed and 12 percentage points more likely to have a job and be out of poverty. Interestingly,
we observe a negative marginal effect for the divorce variable: divorced individuals are 6 percentage
points less likely to have a job and be out of poverty. Divorced men are worse off compared to divorced
women in terms of multiple deprivations.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we use longitudinal data from Russia for the years 20102017 and find that being in a state
of poverty is predominantly a long-term trap, but the trap seems easier to escape for divorced women.
Divorced women were less poor than divorced men during the period of 20102017. Considering the
marginal effects, we found that a divorced woman is 11 percentage points less likely to be in income
poverty than a divorced man and 12 percentage points less likely to be multidimensionally poor. Prior
research has shown that divorce is linked to gender economic inequality (Lundberg et al., 2016) within a
country. As most gender research concentrates on investigating the gap between males and females with
respect to wages or education, without taking into account the effects of divorce, we try to push this
area of research forward by showing the importance of considering marital status when investigating
gender gaps.
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A Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Female Male
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
Demographics
Age 46.60 10.01 47.88 9.70
Divorce 0.13 0.34 0.04 0.18
Retired 0.27 0.44 0.13 0.33
Urban Area 0.63 0.48 0.60 0.49
Education
Elementary Education 0.08 0.27 0.15 0.36
Secondary Education 0.31 0.46 0.46 0.50
Vocational/Technical Education 0.34 0.47 0.21 0.41
University Education 0.27 0.45 0.18 0.38
Poverty and Employment
Income Poverty 0.27 0.44 0.16 0.36
Multidimensional Poverty 0.58 0.49 0.58 0.49
Employment 0.68 0.47 0.75 0.44
Working Experience 21.40 11.53 23.16 11.89
Household
Household Size 2.85 1.50 2.95 1.56
Number of Children 0.68 0.94 0.73 0.96
Health
Health: Very Good 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.09
Health: Good 0.28 0.45 0.35 0.48
Health: Average 0.61 0.49 0.57 0.49
Health: Bad 0.09 0.29 0.07 0.25
Health: Very Bad 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.07
Individuals 1119 832
Note: Source - RLMS-HSE 2010-2017. The sample excludes all individuals who are not present in the survey for the 8 years.
Columns 1 and 3 report the sample averages for female and male populatios, respectively. Columns 2 and 4 report standard
deviations.
Divorce is coded as follows: 1, divorced; 0, not divorced; Retired is equal to 1 if an individual is in the retirement age; 0, if an
individual is not in the retirement age; Urban Area is 1 if he/she lives in urban area; 0, if in rural area; Elementary Educ. is 1, if
the highest level of education of the respondent is below secondary school; 0, if it is not below secondary school; Secondary Educ.
is 1, if highest level of education is secondary school; 0, if highest level of education is not secondary school; Vocational Educ. is 1,
if highest level of education is some vocational/technical training; 0, if highest level of education is not vocational/technical
training; University Educ. is 1, if the highest level of education is university; and 0 if not. Income Poverty is 1, if an individual is
in income poverty; 0, if an individual is not in income poverty; Employed is 1, if an individual is employed; 0, if an individual is
not employed; Multidim. Poverty is 1, if an individual is multidimensionally poor; 0, if an individual is not multidimensionally
poor; Household size is the number of household members, excluding children under 18 years old; Number Children is the number
of children under 18 years old.
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Table 2: Education Levels of Women and Men According to Marital Status
Married Divorced
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Male
Elementary Education 0.15 0.35 0.20 0.40
Secondary Education 0.47 0.50 0.43 0.50
Vocational/Technical Education 0.21 0.41 0.21 0.41
University Education 0.18 0.38 0.15 0.36
Female
Elementary Education 0.08 0.27 0.05 0.21
Secondary Education 0.32 0.47 0.28 0.45
Vocational/Technical Education 0.34 0.47 0.32 0.47
University Education 0.26 0.44 0.35 0.48
Note: Source: RLMS-HSE 20102017. The sample excludes all individuals who are not present in the survey for the 8 years.
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Table 3: Income Poverty: Average Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coeff Std. Err. Coeff Std. Err. Coeff Std. Err. Coeff Std. Err.
Income Povertyt−1 0.16∗∗∗ 0.01 0.16∗∗∗ 0.01 0.12∗∗∗ 0.01 0.12∗∗∗ 0.01
Income Povertyt0 0.29
∗∗∗ 0.02 0.28∗∗∗ 0.02 0.18∗∗∗ 0.01 0.17∗∗∗ 0.01
Female 0.05∗∗∗ 0.01 0.05∗∗∗ 0.01 0.10∗∗∗ 0.01 0.10∗∗∗ 0.01
Divorce -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02
Divorce× Female -0.06∗∗∗ 0.02 -0.04∗∗ 0.02 -0.04∗∗ 0.02
Age -0.02∗∗∗ 0.01 -0.03∗∗ 0.01
Age Sq. 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00
Working Experience 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Secondary Educ. 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
Vocational Educ. 0.01 0.02 -0.00 0.02
University Educ. 0.00 0.03 -0.01 0.03
Employed -0.29∗∗∗ 0.01 -0.29∗∗∗ 0.01
Household Size 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Num. Young Children 0.02∗ 0.01 0.02∗ 0.01
Urban Area -0.03∗∗∗ 0.01 -0.01 0.01
Retired -0.11∗∗∗ 0.01 -0.11∗∗∗ 0.01
Health FE No No Yes Yes
Year FE No No No Yes
Region FE No No No Yes
Longitudinal Means No No Yes Yes
σ2u 0.88 0.86 0.68 0.64
ρ 0.47 0.46 0.40 0.39
Individuals 1951 1951 1951 1951
Note: Source: RLMS-HSE 20102017. The sample excludes all individuals who are not present in the survey throughout
20102017. The table contains the estimated average marginal effect on the probability of being income poor in the period t given
an increase in the value of the relevant regressor. Coefficients are statistically significantly different from the true value at the *
10% level; ** at the 5% level; *** at the 1% level.
The estimations were performed in STATA using the xtprobit routine. It estimates random-effects and population-averaged probit
models for a binary dependent variable. After, the average marginal effects are calculated.
Health FE is coded as follows: 1, very good; 2, good; 3, average; 4, bad; 5, very bad; Year FE includes 6 year dummies; Region
FE includes 40 regional dummies; Longitudinal Means includes averages over 8 years of the time-varying variables Age, Age2,
Working Experience, Employed, Household Size, Number Children, Education, Health, Retired.
σ2u are the variances of the random-effects error terms, ρ is the proportion of the total variance contributed by the panel-level
variance component.
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Table 4: Multidimensional Poverty: Average Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coeff Std. Err. Coeff Std. Err. Coeff Std. Err. Coeff Std. Err.
Multidim. Povertyt−1 0.04∗∗∗ 0.01 0.04∗∗∗ 0.01 0.04∗∗∗ 0.01 0.03∗∗∗ 0.01
Multidim. Povertyt0 0.10
∗∗∗ 0.01 0.10∗∗∗ 0.01 0.03∗∗ 0.01 0.02 0.01
Female 0.11∗∗∗ 0.01 0.11∗∗∗ 0.01 0.16∗∗∗ 0.01 0.15∗∗∗ 0.01
Divorce -0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02
Divorce× Female -0.10∗∗∗ 0.02 -0.06∗∗∗ 0.02 -0.06∗∗∗ 0.02
Age -0.03∗∗∗ 0.01 -0.04∗∗∗ 0.01
Age 2 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00
Working Experience -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Secondary Educ. 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
Vocational Educ. 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02
University Educ. 0.01 0.03 -0.00 0.03
Employed -0.27∗∗∗ 0.01 -0.27∗∗∗ 0.01
Household Size 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Num. Young Children 0.02∗∗ 0.01 0.02∗∗ 0.01
Urban Area -0.05∗∗∗ 0.01 -0.02 0.02
Retired -0.12∗∗∗ 0.01 -0.12∗∗∗ 0.01
Health FE No No Yes Yes
Year FE No No No Yes
Region FE No No No Yes
Longitudinal Means No No Yes Yes
σ2u 2.42 2. 34 1. 63 1. 52
ρ 0.71 0.70 0.62 0.60
Individuals 1951 1951 1951 1951
Note: Source: RLMS-HSE 2010-2017. The sample excludes all individuals who are not present in the survey for the 8 years. The
panel contains the estimated average marginal effect on the probability of being in income poverty in the period t given an
increase in the value of the relevant regressor. Coefficients are statistically significantly different from the true value at the * 10%
level; ** at the 5% level; *** at the 1% level.
The estimations were performed in STATA using the xtprobit routine. It estimates random-effects and population-averaged probit
models for a binary dependent variable. After, the average marginal effect are calculated.
Health FE is coded as follows: 1, very good; 2, good; 3, average; 4, bad; 5, very bad; Year FE includes 6 year dummies; Region
FE includes 40 regional dummies; Longitudinal Means includes averages over 8 years of the time-varying variables: Age, Age2,
Working Experience, Employed, Household Size, Number Children, Education, Health, Retired.
σ2u is the variances of the random-effects error terms, ρ is the proportion of the total variance contributed by the panel-level
variance component.
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Table 5: Matching in Education: Variable Description
Variable Name Values
Elementary Match 0 - education of individual is not "Elementary"
1 - education of the partner is "Elementary"
2 - education of the partner is "Secondary"
3 - education of the partner is "Vocational"
4 - education of the partner is "University"
Secondary Match 0 - education of individual is not "Secondary"
1 - education of the partner is "Elementary"
2 - education of the partner is "Secondary"
3 - education of the partner is "Vocational"
4 - education of the partner is "University"
Vocational Match 0 - education of individual is not "Vocational"
1 - education of the partner is "Elementary"
2 - education of the partner is "Secondary"
3 - education of the partner is "Vocational"
4 - education of the partner is "University"
University Match 0 - education of individual is not "University"
1 - education of the partner is "Elementary"
2 - education of the partner is "Secondary"
3 - education of the partner is "Vocational"
4 - education of the partner is "University"
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Table 6: Educational Matching of Married and Divorced Couples
Married Divorced
Number Percent Number Percent
Elementary Match-Wife
Husband Education
Elementary 457 6.82 37 5.34
Secondary 196 2.92 24 3.36
Vocational 95 1.42 8 1.15
University 24 0.36 3 0.43
Secondary Match-Wife
Husband Education
Elementary 291 4.34 44 6.35
Secondary 999 14.91 117 16.88
Vocational 326 4.86 35 5.05
University 198 2.95 22 3.17
Vocational Match-Wife
Husband Education
Elementary 261 3.89 30 4.33
Secondary 763 11.38 102 14.72
Vocational 559 8.34 69 9.96
University 450 6.71 22 3.17
University Match-Wife
Husband Education
Elementary 106 1.58 18 2.60
Secondary 447 6.67 51 7.36
Vocational 407 6.07 42 6.06
University 1123 16.76 69 9.96
Couples 6702 693
Note: Source: RLMS-HSE 1995-2017. The sample includes couples who either stayed married during the period of observation or
were married and got divorced. Columns 1 and 3 report the number of married and divorced couples, respectively, whereas
columns 2 and 4 represent the percentage of couples in each educational category. Each subcategory is based upon the wife's
education level: Elementary Match-Wife, Secondary Match-Wife, Vocational Match-Wife, University Match-Wife, and in each
subcategory the wife's educational level does not change. In turn, each subcategory is split in four: Elementary, Secondary,
Vocational, University, having as allocation key the husband's educational level.
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Table 7: Summary Statistics: Wife
Married Before Divorce After Divorce
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
Age 46.56 13.98 38.04 11.59 42.69 11.16
Income Poverty 0.43 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.26 0.44
Employment 0.61 0.49 0.71 0.46 0.79 0.41
Individuals 6702 693 570
Note: Source: RLMS-HSE 1995-2017. The sample includes wives who either stayed married during the period of observation or
were married and got divorced. Columns 1 and 2 report the mean and the standard deviation for wives who stayed married
during the period of observation. Columns 3 and 4 report the mean and the standard deviation for wives before the marital split,
and columns 5 and 6 report the same information for wives after the marital split. Income Poverty is coded as follows: 1, an
individual is in income poverty; 0, an individual is not in income poverty; Employed is equal to 1 if an individual is employed; 0, if
an individual is not employed.
Table 8: Summary Statistics: Husband
Married Before Divorce After Divorce
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
Age 48.77 13.94 39.67 11.36 43.05 11.72
Poverty 0.26 0.44 0.34 0.47 0.40 0.49
Employment 0.69 0.46 0.76 0.43 0.64 0.48
Individuals 6702 693 309
Note: Source: RLMS-HSE 1995-2017. The sample includes husbands who either stayed married during the period of observation
or were married and got divorced. Columns 1 and 2 report the mean and the standard deviation for husbands who stayed married
during the period of observation. Columns 3 and 4 report the mean and the standard deviation for husbands before the marital
split, and columns 5 and 6 report the same information for husbands after the marital split. Income Poverty is coded as follows:
1, an individual is in income poverty; 0, an individual is not in income poverty; Employed is equal to 1 if an individual is
employed; 0, if an individual is not employed.
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Table 9: Probability of Divorce: Average Marginal Effects
Wife Husband
Coeff Std.Err. Coeff Std.Err.
Secondary Match
Partner's Education
Elementary 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.02
Secondary -0.01 0.01 -0.02∗∗ 0.01
Vocational -0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.01
University -0.01 0.02 -0.03∗∗∗ 0.01
Vocational Match
Partner's Education
Elementary 0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.03
Secondary 0.00 0.01 -0.03∗∗ 0.01
Vocational -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.01
University -0.06∗∗∗ 0.01 -0.04∗∗∗ 0.01
University Match
Partner's Education
Elementary 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.07
Secondary -0.03∗ 0.02 -0.03 0.02
Vocational -0.03∗∗ 0.02 -0.07∗∗∗ 0.01
University -0.06∗∗∗ 0.01 -0.06∗∗∗ 0.01
Age Partner -0.01∗∗∗ 0.01 -0.01∗∗∗ 0.01
Individuals 7395 7395
Note: Source: RLMS-HSE 1995-2017. The sample includes couples who either stayed married during the period of observation or
were married and got divorced. The panel contains the estimated average marginal effect on the probability of getting divorced
given an increase in the value of the relevant regressor, reported in columns 1 and 3. The standard errors are reported in columns
2 and 4. Coefficients are statistically significantly different from the true value at the * 10% level; ** at the 5% level; *** at the
1% level.
Results are reported separately for wives and husbands: columns 1 and 2, columns 3 and 4, respectively. Each subcategory of
education is based upon the individual's education level: Secondary Match, Vocational Match, University Match, and in each
subcategory the individual's educational level does not change. In turn, each subcategory is split in four: Elementary, Secondary,
Vocational, University, having as allocation key the partner's educational level.
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Table 10: Income Poverty using the Predicted Probability of Divorce: Average Marginal Effects
Female Male
Coeff Std.Err. Coeff Std.Err.
Income Povertyt−1 0.15∗∗∗ 0.02 0.10∗∗∗ 0.02
Income Povertyt0 0.13
∗∗∗ 0.02 0.17∗∗∗ 0.03
Pr. Divorce -0.14 0.29 0.93∗∗ 0.41
Age -0.05∗ 0.03 0.01 0.02
Age Sq. 0.00∗∗ 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Working Experience -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Secondary Educ. 0.00 0.04 -0.01 0.02
Vocational Educ. -0.05 0.06 -0.01 0.04
University Educ. -0.14∗∗ 0.07 0.04 0.07
Employed -0.32∗∗∗ 0.03 -0.23∗∗∗ 0.03
Household Size 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01
Num. Young Children 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02
Urban Area -0.04 0.03 -0.04 0.02
Retired -0.15∗∗∗ 0.03 -0.11∗∗∗ 0.02
Health FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes
Longitudinal Means Yes Yes
σ2u 0.47 0.53
ρ 0.32 0.35
Individuals 488 456
Note: Source: RLMS-HSE 20102017. The sample excludes all individuals who are not present in the survey for the 8 years and
who are not married. The panel contains the estimated average marginal effect on the probability of being in income poverty in
the period t given an increase in the value of the relevant regressor. Coefficients are statistically significantly different from the
true value at the * 10% level; ** at the 5% level; *** at the 1% level.
The estimations were performed in STATA using the xtprobit routine. It estimates random-effects and population-averaged probit
models for a binary dependent variable. After, the average marginal effect are calculated.
Pr. Divorce is the estimated probability of getting divorced, based on the characteristics reported in Table 9 ; Health FE is coded
as follows: 1, very good; 2, good; 3, average; 4, bad; 5, very bad; Year FE includes 6 year dummies; Region FE includes 40
regional dummies; Longitudinal Means includes averages over 8 years of the time-varying variables: Age, Age2, Working
Experience, Employed, Household Size, Number Children, Education, Health, Retired.
σ2u is the variances of the random-effects error terms, ρ is the proportion of the total variance contributed by the panel-level
variance component.
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Table 11: Income Poverty Estimates of the Bivariate Probability Random Effects Model
Poverty LFP
Coeff Std.Err. Coeff Std.Err.
Income Povertyt−1 0.79∗∗∗ 0.05 0.05 0.07
Employedt−1 −0.21∗∗ 0.07 1.53∗∗∗ 0.06
Income Povertyt0 0.8
∗∗∗ 0.07 -0.14∗ 0.07
Employedt0 −0.03 0.07 0.7∗∗∗ 0.09
Female 0.49∗∗∗ 0.06 -0.13∗∗∗ 0.06
Divorce 0.37∗ 0.17 -0.23 0.18
Female × Divorce −0.61∗∗ 0.19 0.43∗ 0.21
Age −0.26∗∗∗ 0.08 0.27 ∗ 0.09
Age2 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01 -0.01∗∗∗ 0.01
Working Experience 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01
Secondary Educ. −0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08
Vocational Educ. −0.28∗∗∗ 0.08 0.26∗∗ 0.08
University Educ. −0.47∗∗∗ 0.09 0.49∗∗∗ 0.09
Household Size 0.12∗ 0.03 -0.06 0.03
Number Children 0.04 0.05 -0.09 0.06
Urban Area −0.07 0.08 0.1 0.09
Retired −0.67∗∗∗ 0.08 -0.71∗∗∗ 0.09
Health FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes
Longitudinal Means Yes Yes
σ2α1 0.52
∗∗∗ 0.06
σ2α2 0.55
∗∗∗ 0.08
ρα −0.51∗∗∗ 0.10
ρu −0.64∗∗∗ 0.04
Individuals 1951
Note: Source: RLMS-HSE 2010-2017. The sample excludes all individuals who are not present in the survey for the 8 years. The
first column contains the point estimates on the probability of being income poor in the period t, the third column contains the
point estimates on the probability of being employed in the period t. Standard errors are reported in columns 2 and 4.
Coefficients are statistically significantly different from the true value at the * 0.10 level; ** at the 0.05 level; *** at the 0.01 level.
The estimations were performed in STATA using the bireprob routine. It estimates two nonlinear regressions and accounts for the
correlation in the time-specific and individual-specific error terms (Plum, 2016).
Health FE is equal to 1 if health is very good; 2 if good; 3 if average; 4 if bad; and 5 if very bad; Year FE includes 6 year
dummies; Region FE includes 40 regional dummies; Longitudinal Means includes averages over 8 years of the time-varying
variables Age, Age2, Working Experience, Household Size, Number Children, Education, Health, Retired.
σ2α1 and σ
2
α2
are the variances of the random-effects error terms, ρα is the correlation of the random-effects error terms, ρu is the
correlation of the idiosyncratic shock.
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Table 12: Marginal Effects: Income Poverty (at mean values)
Poor = 1, LFP = 1 Poor = 1, LFP = 0 Poor = 0, LFP = 1 Poor = 0, LFP = 0
Coeff Std.Err. Coeff Std.Err. Coeff Std.Err. Coeff Std.Err.
Female 0.049∗∗∗ 0.01 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01 -0.19∗∗∗ 0.02 -0.01 0.02
Divorce 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02
Divorce × Female -0.04∗∗∗ 0.01 -0.1∗∗∗ 0.01 0.21∗∗∗ 0.01 -0.03∗∗∗ 0.01
Individuals 1951
Note: Source: RLMS-HSE 2010-2017. The sample excludes all individuals who are not present in the survey for the 8 years. The
first column contains the estimated marginal effect on the probability of being in income poverty and employed ; the third column
contains the estimated marginal effect on the probability of being in income poverty and unemployed ; the fifth column contains
the estimated marginal effect on the probability of being not in income poverty and employed ; the seventh column contains the
estimated marginal effect on the probability of being not in income poverty and unemployed ; given an increase in the value of the
relevant regressor, holding all other regressors at their mean values. Standard errors are reported in columns 2, 4, 6, 8.
Coefficients are statistically significantly different from the true value at the * 10% level; ** at the 5% level; *** at the 1% level.
Female is equal to 1 if female and 0 if male; Divorce is equal to 1 if divorced and 0 if not divorced; Divorce × Female is an
interaction term of the variables Divorce and Female.
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Table 13: Multidimensional Poverty Estimates of the Bivariate Probability Random Effects Model
Poverty LFP
Coeff Std.Err. Coeff Std.Err.
Multidim. Povertyt−1 0.67∗∗∗ 0.04 -0.11∗ 0.06
Employedt−1 −0.02 0.05 1.45∗∗∗ 0.06
Multidim. Povertyt0 0.77
∗∗∗ 0.05 -0.01 0.07
Employedt0 −0.03 0.06 0.86∗∗∗ 0.09
Female 0.08 0.05 -0.12∗ 0.06
Divorce 0.46∗∗ 0.16 -0.24 0.18
Female × Divorce −0.38∗ 0.17 0.40 0.2
Age 0.07 0.07 0.23∗∗ 0.09
Age2 −0.01 0.01 -0.01∗∗∗ 0.01
Working Experience −0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01
Secondary Educ. −0.01 0.06 0.04 0.08
Vocational Educ. −0.09 0.07 0.26∗∗ 0.09
University Educ. −0.24∗∗ 0.07 0.46∗∗∗ 0.10
Household Size 0.01 0.02 -0.06∗ 0.03
Number Children 0.03 0.05 -0.08 0.06
Urban Area −0.47∗∗∗ 0.07 0.20∗ 0.10
Retired −0.22∗∗ 0.07 -0.75∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗
Health FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes
Longitudinal Means Yes Yes
σ2α1 0.44
∗∗∗ 0.05
σ2α2 0.67
∗∗ 0.07
ρα 0.064 0.06
ρu −0.017 0.03
Individuals 1951
Note: Source: RLMS-HSE 20102017. The sample excludes all individuals who are not present in the survey for the 8 years. The
first column contains the point estimates on the probability of being multidimensionally poor in the period t, the third column
contains the point estimates on the probability of being employed in the period t. Standard errors are reported in columns 2 and 4.
Coefficients are statistically significantly different from the true value at the * 0.10 level; ** at the 0.05 level; *** at the 0.01 level.
The estimations were performed in STATA using the bireprob routine. It estimates two nonlinear regressions and accounts for the
correlation in the time-specific and individual-specific error terms (Plum, 2016).
Health FE is coded as follows: 1, very good; 2, good; 3, average; 4, bad; 5, very bad; Year FE includes 6 year dummies; Region
FE includes 40 regional dummies; Longitudinal Means includes averages over 8 years of the time-varying variables Age, Age2,
Working Experience, Household Size, Number Children, Education, Health, Retired.
σ2α1 and σ
2
α2
are the variances of the random-effects error terms, ρα is the correlation of the random-effects error terms, ρu is the
correlation of the idiosyncratic shock.
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Table 14: Marginal Effects: Multidimensional Poverty (at mean values)
Poor = 1, LFP = 1 Poor = 1, LFP = 0 Poor = 0, LFP = 1 Poor = 0, LFP = 0
Coeff Std.Err. Coeff Std.Err. Coeff Std.Err. Coeff Std.Err.
Female -0.01 0.01 0.01∗ 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
Divorce 0.06∗∗ 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.06∗∗∗ 0.02 -0.02∗ 0.01
Divorce × Female -0.03∗∗∗ 0.01 -0.09∗∗∗ 0.01 0.12∗∗∗ 0.01 -0.01∗∗∗ 0.01
Individuals 1951
Note: Source: RLMS-HSE 2010-2017. The sample excludes all individuals who are not present in the survey for the 8 years. The
first column contains the estimated marginal effect on the probability of being multidimensionally poor and employed ; the third
column contains the estimated marginal effect on the probability of being multidimensionally poor and unemployed ; the fifth
column contains the estimated marginal effect on the probability of being not multidimensionally poor and employed ; the seventh
column contains the estimated marginal effect on the probability of being not multidimensionally poor and unemployed ; given an
increase in the value of the relevant regressor, holding all other regressors at their mean values. Standard errors are reported in
columns 2, 4, 6, and 8. Coefficients are statistically significantly different from the true value at the * 10% level; ** at the 5%
level; *** at the 1% level.
Female is coded as follows: 1, female; 0, male; Divorce is 1 if divorced; 0 if not divorced; Divorce × Female is an interaction term
of the variables Divorce and Female.
B Variable Definitions and Sources
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 Tables A1.1: Dependent Variables  
NAME DESCRIPTION DATA 
 
Income Poverty  
 
Dummy variable: 
1 – an individual is in poverty at time t 
 
0 – an individual is in poverty at time t 
pooritj = 1 if J60 < living_wagejt 
pooritj = 0 if J60 >= 
living_wagejt 
Labor Force 
Participation 
Dummy variable: 
1 – an individual is working or is on non-
paid or paid leave, including maternity 
leave or leave to care for a child under 3 
year old at time t 
 
0 – an individual is not employed at time t 
lfpitj = 1 if J77 = 1 
lfpitj = 0 if J77 = 2 
Multidimensional 
Poverty 
 
Dummy variable: 
1 – an individual is multidimensionally 
poor at time t 
 
0 – an individual is multidimensionally 
poor at time t 
poor_multitj = 1 if 
mult_poverty >= 1/3 
poor_multitj = 0 if 
mult_poverty < 1/3 
 
 
Tables A1.2: Control Variables 
NAME DESCRIPTION DATA 
 
Lag of Poverty  1 – an individual is in poverty at time t-1 
0 – an individual is in poverty at time t-1 
l_poor itj 
Lag of Labor Force 
Participation 
1 – an individual is employed at time t-1 
0 – an individual is not employed at time t-1 
l_lfpitj 
Poverty in First Period  1 – an individual is in poverty at time t=1 
0 – an individual is in poverty at time t=1 
poor0 itj 
Labor Force Participation 
in the First Period 
1 – an individual is employed at time t=1 
0 – an individual is not employed at time t=1 
lfp0 itj 
Age Age at time t age 
Age2 Age squared at t  age_sq = age2 
Divorce  1 – an individual is divorced at time t=1 
0 – an individual is married at time t=1 
divorce = 1 if marst = 4 or marst = 6 
divorce = 0 if marst = 2 or marst = 3 or 
marst = 7 
Experience  Years of employment  J161_3Y 
 
Education 1 – an individual has an elementary 
education 
2 – an individual has a secondary education 
3 – an individual has a vocational (technical) 
education 
4 – an individual has a university education 
diplom_1= 1 if diplom ==1 | diplom ==2 
| diplom == 3  
diplom_1 = 2 if diplom == 4 
diplom_1 = 3 if diplom == 5 
diplom_1 = 4 if diplom == 6 
Number of Young 
Children  
Number of young children 
in the household 
J72_173 
Household Size Number of household members (except 
young children) 
household_size_1 = nfm - J72_173 
Retired  1 – an individual is at the retirement age at 
time t 
0 – an individual is at the retirement age at 
time t 
retired=1 if age > 54 & female = 1 
retired=1 if age > 59 & male = 1 
Health  1 – an individual estimates his health as 
“very good” 
2 – an individual estimates his health as 
“good” 
3 – an individual estimates his health as 
“average” 
4 – an individual estimates his health as 
“bad” 
5 – an individual estimates his health as 
“very bad” 
M3 
Urban Area 1 – an individual lives in an urban area 
0 – an individual lives in a rural area 
urban = 1 if status = 3 
Year  Year of the survey  INT_Y 
Region 1 – 38 indicates region and the city/village 
where an individual lives  
region  
 
 Tables A1.3: Material Deprivation  
NAME DESCRIPTION DATA 
 
Material Deprivation  
 
Dummy variable: 
1 – an individual lives in a materially 
deprived household at time t 
0 – an individual lives in a non-materially 
deprived household at time t 
p_living_conitj = 1 if 
conditionsjt > 0.4  
p_living_conitj = 0 otherwise  
 
Conditionsit 
Flat colour TV 1 - No  
0 - Yes 
C9_5_1A 
Central sewerage 1 - No  
0 - Yes 
C7_5 
Dacha (country house) 1 - No  
0 - Yes 
C9_101A 
Manage to have meal 
regularly?  
1 - No  
0 - Yes 
M152 
Hot water   1 - No  
0 - Yes 
C7_3 
Do you or your family 
have the means, if you 
wish, to make a big 
purchase? 
1 - Yes  
0 - No 
J721633 
Are you concerned 
about providing yourself 
with the most necessary 
things in the next 12 
months? 
1 – Very Concerned  
0 – Otherwise 
J66 
Mobile phone  1 - No  
0 - Yes 
J184 
Microwave  1 - No  
0 - Yes 
C9_3_1A 
Refrigerator  1 - No  
0 - Yes 
C9_1_1A 
 
Tables A1.4: Multidimensional Poverty 
NAME DESCRIPTION DATA 
 
Multidimensional 
Poverty 
 
Dummy variable: 
1 – an individual is multidimensionally poor at 
time t 
0 – an individual is multidimensionally poor at 
time t 
An individual is multidimensionally poor if 
he/she is deprived in at least one dimension (or 
the equivalent sum of the weighted 
deprivations). 
poor_multitj = 1 if 
mult_poverty >= 1/3 
poor_multitj = 0 if 
mult_poverty < 1/3 
 
 
Poverty Dimensions 
NAME DESCRIPTION          DATA                          WEIGHTS 
 
Dimension 1 – ECONOMIC  
Income Poverty 1 – an individual is in poverty at time t 
0 – an individual is in poverty at time 
t 
pooritj = 1 if J60 < living_wagejt 
pooritj = 0 if J60 >= living_wagejt 
1/6 
Work Intensity 1 - an individual works more then 8 
hours per day 
0 - an individual works less then 8 
hours per day 
dep_work = 1 if hours_work > 8 
dep_work = 0 if hours_work <= 8 
1/6 
Dimension 2 – LIVING CONDITIONS 
Material 
Deprivation 
1 – an individual lives in a materially 
deprived household at time t 
0 – an individual lives in a non-
materially deprived household at time 
t 
p_living_conitj = 1 if 
conditionsjt > 0.4  
p_living_conitj = 0 otherwise 
1/3 
Dimension 3 - HEALTH 
Have you 
rejected medical 
help because of 
lack of money in 
the last 12 
months? 
1 - Yes  
0 - No 
no_money_med =1 if F16_1=1 
no_money_med = 0 otherwise 
1/9 
Self-health 
evaluation  
1 – an individual’s self-evaluation 
health is lower than fair at time t 
0 – an individual’s self-evaluation 
health is higher than fair at time t 
dep_health = 1 if health_e = 5 or 
health_e = 4 
dep_health = 0 if health_e = 1 or 
health_e = 2 or health_e = 3 
1/9 
Do you have any 
chronic diseases? 
1 - Yes  
0 - No 
chron_disease = 1 if M20_6* = 1 
chron_disease = 0 otherwise  
1/9 
 
C Marginal Effects Calculation for Univariate Probability Model
We calculate marginal effects following Norton et al. (2004). For the dummies Female and Divorce (x):
E[y|x,X] = Φ(γ1x+ βX) = Φ(u)
where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution. If F is the probability that y = 1, then the
marginal effect of dummy x is the discreet difference:
∆F
∆x
= F (γ1 + βX)− F (βX)
Instead, the marginal effect of of the interaction term of Divorce × Female is derived as
follows:
E[y|x1, x2, X] = Φ(γ1x1 + γ2x2 + γ12x1 ∗ x2 + βX) = Φ(u)
When the interacted variables are both dummy variables, the interaction effect is the discrete double
difference:
∆F
∆x1∆x2
= F (γ1 + γ2 + γ12 + βX)− F (γ1 + βX)− F (γ2 + βX) + F (βX)
D The Structure of the Dynamic Bivariate Model
The sample likelihood is the following (Stewart, 2006; Plum, 2016)
L =
N∏
i=1
∫
α1
∫
α2
T∏
t=2
[Pit(α1, α2)] f2(α1, α2, ρασα,1σα,2)dα1dα2,
where Pit(.) is the joint probability of the observed binary sequence for individual i, f2(.) is the joint
density of (α1, α2), with the covariance of the random-effects error terms ρασα,1σα,2.
Our estimation method allows for correlated unobserved heterogeneity and accounts for the
initial conditions of the two processes. To estimate a bivariate random effects model, we use the
command bireprob, written by Plum (2016). This command uses the maximum simulated likelihood
and considers correlation in the random-effects error terms and in the idiosyncratic shock. Random
effects are simulated using 10 Halton draws.
The variance of the composite errors are not normally distributed (σ2α,j 6= 1), therefore, the
predicted probabilities need to be corrected for
√
1
σ2α,j
(Plum, 2016).
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